SOCIAL SECURITY-SEx

DISCRIMINATION-STATUTORY

CLASSIFICA-

TIONS BASED ON SEX ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY "SUSPECT"-Wiesen-

feld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973).
Stephen and Paula Wiesenfeld were married in November, 1970.
When Paula died in June, 1972, Stephen was left with the responsibility
of caring for his infant son. For the seven-year period immediately
preceding her death, Paula was employed as a school teacher in various
locations. During the entire course of that employment, maximum
social security deductions were taken from her salary. Throughout the
marriage, Paula had always been the principal wage earner, and even
in the year of her death, she earned considerably more than twice as
much as her husband. Subsequent to his wife's death, Stephen gained
employment with an industrial engineering and computer sciences firm.
He was dismissed from that position approximately seven months later
and was unemployed thereafter.1
Immediately after the death of his wife, Stephen applied for benefits at the social security office in New Brunswick, New Jersey. 2 He
succeeded in obtaining child's insurance benefits for his son pursuant
to section 402(d)3 of the Social Security Act, but was informed that he
could not collect survivor's benefits under section 4 02(g) 4 since that
section was applicable only to women. The plaintiff then brought suit
to determine whether section 402(g) amounted to sexual discrimination
in violation of the "equal protection component" of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. 5 A three-judge district court was con1 Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981, 984 (D.N.J. 1973).
2 Id.

3 Id. at 984. See also 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1970).
4 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970), entitled "Mother's insurance benefits," provides in part:
(1) The widow and every surviving divorced mother... of an individual who
died a fully or currently insured individual, if such widow or surviving divorced
mother(A) is not married,
(B) is not entitled to a widow's insurance benefit,
(C) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits, or is entitled to old-age
insurance benefits, each of which is less than three-fourths of the primary
insurance amount of such individual,
(D) has filed application for mother's insurance benefits, or was entitled
to wife's insurance benefits on the basis of the wages and self-employment
income of such individual for the month preceding the month in which he
died,

(E) at the time of filing such application has in her care a child of such
individual entitled to a child's insurance benefit....
shall . . . be entitled to a mother's insurance benefit ....

(2) Such mother's insurance benefit for each month shall be equal to threefourths of the primary insurance amount of such deceased individual.
5 Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981, 984 (D.N.J. 1973). Although the
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vened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 2282 and 2284,0 and a jurisdic7
tional basis was established under 28 U.S.C. section 1331.
In Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW,8 the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey declared sex to be an "inherently
suspect" statutory classification and thus subject to "close judicial
scrutiny."' When tested by that standard, section 402(g) was found to
work an invidious discrimination in providing smaller social security
benefits to the families of female wage earners. This discrimination
could not be justified even though the purpose of section 402(g) was to
rectify past and present injustices done to women. In practice, the
statute served to disadvantage some members of the very class it was
fifth amendment contains no equal protection clause, it forbids "discrimination that is
'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.' " Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168
(1964) (quoting from Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)). Courts have invoked
the body of equal protection case law developed in the application of the fourteenth
amendment to the states in considering equal protection challenges to the actions of the
federal government. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
6 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1970) provides:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any Act of Congress for repugnance to the Constitution of
the United States shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof unless
the application therefor is heard -and determined by a district court of three
judges under section 2284 of this title.
Section 2284 prescribes the composition of a three-judge court and the procedure it
shall follow. Id. § 2284.
7 Id. § 1331 provides that federal districts shall have jurisdiction where a controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States and the
amount in question exceeds $10,000.
Jurisdiction may be established under section 1331 if the plaintiff proves that $10,000
is in controversy. See 1 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrICE
0.92[l] (2d ed. rev. 1974).
The defendant contended that the plaintiff's claim had failed to satisfy the jurisdictional amount, alleging that damages were too speculative since the plaintiff had gained
employment at the time his complaint was filed. (The maximum amount he could have
received for the interval between his wife's death and his employment was approximately
$2100.) Defendant's First Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss
or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 4-7, 18, Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J.
1973) [hereinafter cited as Defendant's First Supplemental Memorandum]. The defendant
further argued that the measure of damages under section 1331 must be predicated on
probable future events, not on those contingencies that are merely possible. Id. at 6.
However, the court believed it "futile" to dismiss for want of jurisdiction on the
ground that the plaintiff's loss was too improbable. In fact, he was employed at the
time of argument. Moreover, a dismissal would not prevent the plaintiff from bringing a
subsequent suit on the same claims. Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981,
986 (D.N.J. 1973).
The court also ruled that the plaintiff need not wait until his claims exceeded $10,000.
He had only to show that the amount of the benefits he might receive under the allegedly
unconstitutional statute exceeds $10,000. Id.
8 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973).
9 Id. at 990-91.
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benefit. 10

meant to
The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, directed that the plaintiff be compensated for the benefits he had
been denied, and enjoined defendant from withholding section 402(g)
benefits from widowers on the basis of sex alone."
In evaluating an equal protection challenge to a statutory classification, a court must first determine the standard of review to be applied. For a court employing "traditional" equal protection analysis,
review is almost always a mere formality so that, practically without
exception, the validity of the statute is sustained. 1 2 This attitude of
judicial restraint has been grounded on the belief that a state will be
unable to function without the power to classify its citizens for some
purposes and to treat those in one classification differently from those
in another. 3 Thus, "[a] statutory discrimination will not be set aside
if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."'1 4 An example of the Supreme Court's willingness to indulge every presumption of constitutionality in order to sustain statutory classifications is
Goesaert v. Cleary,15 where the Court considered a Michigan statute
that forbade the employment of women as bartenders although women
could serve as cocktail waitresses in the very same establishments. Exempt from the operation of the law were the wives and daughters of
male tavern owners. The Court upheld the classification, finding justi10

Id.

11 Id. Since there were no questions of material fact in controversy, both parties had
moved for summary judgment. Id. at 984.
12 Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv.
1, 8 (1972).
13 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), still the model for minimum
scrutiny, set forth guidelines a court should follow: (I) A state is allowed a broad scope
of discretion in setting up classifications to carry out laws pursuant to its police power;
such laws are void only where they are without reasonable basis. (2) A classification that
does have a reasonable basis is not rendered infirm "merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality." (3) If any set
of facts can be conceived to justify the law, that state of facts will be assumed. (4) The
party who attacks the classification as unreasonable bears the burden of proof. Id. at 78-79.
This approach is applied especially in economic regulation and social welfare expenditure cases. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). The state of
facts that renders the statute constitutionally permissible need not be the one the legislature most probably had in mind. Depending on the degree to which a court is willing
to defer to legislative judgment, any hypothetical set of facts, however improbable, may
be assumed. See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv.
1065, 1077-78 (1969).
14 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
15 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
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fication in the legislature's interest in preventing the "moral and social
problems" to which a woman's bartending would give rise.16
In the early 1960's, the Warren Court carved out a new standard of
review-"strict" scrutiny. To pass muster under this test, a classification must bear something more than a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest; a "compelling" state interest must be demonstrated if the statute is to be sustained.1 7 The result is a scrutiny
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact."' 8 When that formula is invoked,
the statute challenged is almost certain to fall. "Strict" scrutiny is employed where the interests involved are deemed "fundamental"' 9 or
where the statute is based on a constitutionally "suspect" classification
such as race, 20 alienage, 21 or national origin. 22 Although the Court has
yet to articulate precise criteria to aid in the determination of whether
a particular classification is "suspect," existing "suspect" classifications
would seem to be those determined by factors over which the individual
28
has no control.
16 Id. at 466. It should be noted that all of the members of the Court were not inclined to allow a legislature so much leeway. Three Justices dissented, characterizing the
discrimination worked by the statute as arbitrary. Id. at 467-68 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
17 See generally Note, supra note 13, at 1087-132.
18 Gunther, supra note 12, at 8.
If there is a governmental interest so "compelling" that it can survive "strict"
scrutiny, the court has yet to discover it outside of emergency legislation necessary for
national security in time of war. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
19 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969) (the right to travel);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (the right to vote); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (the right to an appeal from a criminal conviction).
The Court has never set forth criteria as to how it will judge which rights are
"fundamental." It has been satisfied to approach the problem on a case-by-case basis and
to indicate the factors that make a particular right "fundmental." See Note, supra note 13,
at 1130-31. This removal of certain subjects from legislative competence has been likened to
substantive due process since it often deals with areas of which no specific mention is
made in the Constitution. See Gunther, supra note 12, at 8-9. It should also be noted
that the present Court has been loathe to expand the list of "fundamental" interests the
Warren Court bequeathed to it. See id. at 12-14.
20 See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
21 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
22 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
28 One commentator has developed three criteria which seem to characterize those
classifications already ruled "suspect":
(1) a general ill-suitedness to the advancement of any proper governmental objective; (2) a high degree of adaptation to uses which are oppressive in the sense
of systematic and unfair devaluation, through majority rule, of the claims of
certain persons to nondiscriminatory sharing in the benefits and burdens of social
existence; (3) a potency to injure through an effect of stigmatizing certain persons
by implying popular or official belief in their inherent inferiority or undeservingness.
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Courts have traditionally measured the constitutionality of sexbased classifications by rational relationship standards. In Muller v.
Oregon,24 a case frequently cited by courts in approving protective legislation for women, 25 the Court upheld against a due process attack an
Oregon statute that limited the number of hours women could work in
laundries. That subject was deemed proper for the legislature even
though just three years earlier, the same Court had struck down almost
identical legislation that applied to men. 28 Once considered a model of
enlightened jurisprudence, Muller has lost some of its vitality, and it is
doubtful that the validity of such legislation would be sustained to27
day.
Even though the present Court would probably stop short of accepting the philosophy of Muller, it has so far declined to include sex
among the classifications it deems "suspect," although other courts have
taken the initiative and have done so. 28 The Court could have conMichelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through
the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 20 (1969) (footnote omitted). Of course,
racial classifications have always been an area of especial judicial concern since elimination
of racial discrimination was foremost in the minds of the framers of the fourteenth amendment. See Note, supra note 13, at 1124-25. This is at least ai partial explanation for the
attention the Court has paid to racial distinctions. The Court has declared other classifications "suspect" by analogizing them to race. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 686-87 (1973).
24 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
25 See, e.g., State v. Hunter, 208 Ore. 282, 288, 300 P.2d 455, 458 (1956) (statute barring
female wrestlers); Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86, 99 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 230 (1959) (state not compelled to admit women to branch of state university).
26 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Muller Court was undoubtedly convinced of the wisdom of the Oregon legislation by the arguments in the famous factual
brief submitted by Louis Brandeis. 208 U.S. at 419. However, the fact that the Court
could arrive at opposite conclusions with respect to almost identical pieces of legislation
is perhaps most satisfactorily explained by that Court's substantive due process philosophy,
under which it was not reluctant to consider the soundness of the enactment before it
and thus substitute its judgment for that of the legislature.
27 Muller has yet to be overruled, but the characterization of some courts of the
paternalistic attitudes that gave rise to its reasoning represent thinly-veiled attacks on its
philosophy. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) ("romantic paternalism'); Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 1973) ("Victorian attitudes").
The Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 et seq. (1973),
prohibit the enactment of state laws that limit the employment of females, including those
which forbid employment "for more than a specified number of hours per day or per
week." Id. § 1604.2(b)(1). The Guidelines are not binding on courts, but they are published
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission pursuant to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l et seq. (1970), and undoubtedly exert a
great influence on judges and attorneys general who interpret the Act. See, e.g., Rosenfeld
v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1971); 2 CCH EMP. PRAcrICEs GUME
5115 (1972) (New York Attorney General's Opinion).
28 See Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 16-20, 485 P.2d 529, 539-41, 95 Cal. Rptr.
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fronted the question in Reed v. Reed,29 where it considered an Idaho
probate statute30 that gave mandatory preference to males in a competition for letters of administration where the male and the female bore
the same relationship to the deceased. 31 Instead, the Court attempted to
avoid applying a new test to sex-based classifications and chose to strike
down the statute by means of the rational basis standard. While finding
that there was "some legitimacy" to the statutory purpose of reduction
of the workload in probate courts, the Court declared that the mandatory preference of one sex over the other to accomplish this was the
kind of "arbitrary" choice that failed to satisfy the demands of equal
protection. 32 Chief Justice Burger, speaking for a unanimous Court,
purported to test the statute by traditional equal protection standards:
The Equal Protection Clause... [denies] to States the power to

legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by
a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. 33
On occasion, pre-Reed courts had utilized similar language to find
sex-based classifications invalid. 34 But since Reed, a remarkable num329, 33941 (1971). In Kirby, the Supreme Court of California struck down a statute almost
identical to the one upheld in Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), equating sex-based
characteristics with those of other "suspect" classifications and noting that women have historically been relegated to an inferior status. See also United States ex rel. Robinson v.
York, 281 F. Supp. 8, 14 (D. Conn. 1968), where the court, though not using the term "suspect classification," found it difficult to understand why "women, as one of the specific
groups that compose humanity, should have a lesser measure of protection than a racial
group" and thus invalidated a statute that provided differential prison terms for men and
women. See generally Note, Sex Discriminationand Equal Protection:Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1499 (1971); Comment, Are Sex-Based Classifications Constitutionally Suspect?, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 481 (1971).
29 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
30 IDAHO CODE § 15-314 (1948), repealed, ch. 111, § 5, [1971] Idaho Laws 374.
31 The probate court made no attempt to assess the capabilities of the candidates to
administer the estate, but ruled the male applicant, the father of the deceased, statutorily
entitled to the letters of administration over the female applicant, the deceased's mother.
404 U.S. at 73.
32 Id. at 76.
33 Id. at 75-76. In Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), the Court
stated the test somewhat differently in holding unconstitutional a Louisiana workmen's
compensation statute that provided differentials in recovery that could be obtained by
legitimate and illegitimate children. The Court asked: "What legitimate state interest
does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification
endanger?" Id. at 173. Commentators have interpreted Weber and Reed as establishing a
new "means-focused" equal protection model-at least where a statute employs sex-related
means-and have fully discussed the implications of this formula. See Getman, The Emerging ConstitutionalPrinciple of Sexual Equality, 1972 Sup. CT. REv. 157, 158-66; Gunther,
supra note 12, at 21.
84 See, e.g., Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1253, 1260
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ber of courts have seized upon the Chief Justice's language and have
construed it as signalling a new equal protection test under which
courts will recognize a wide variety of equal protection claims on rational relationship grounds. Applying what has become known as
"means-focused" scrutiny, a court will demand that a statutory classification actually further the statutory goal. In addition, courts will be
less likely to cast about for an hypothetical set of facts to justify a statute
and less tolerant of legislative classifications with no apparent basis in
reality.8 5 Thus, Reed has been interpreted not only as the cue to apply

a new equal protection formula, but also as a sign that equal protection
attacks should be sustained on a wide variety of statutes that draw sexbased classifications.8" As an indication of the confidence courts have in
the vitality of this "means-focused" reasoning, at least one federal court
has employed it to arrive at a result directly contrary to that of a rela-

tively recent Supreme Court decision.3 7 One commentator 8 was not able
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), where the exclusion of female patrons was held violative of equal protection. The court declared that the assertion that a state may draw " 'a sharp line between
the sexes'" should not be invoked without due "regard to the reasonableness of the relationship between the purposes of the discrimination and the sex-based classification." Id.
In Karczewski v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 274 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. 111. 1967), the court found
that no reasonable set of facts could be set forth to justify a statute that allowed men but
not women to recovw for loss of consortium, Id. at 177-78.
35 See Gunther, supra note 12, at 18-20.
80 For example, in Smith v. City of E. Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973),
the court read Reed as evidence of the Supreme Court's willingness to review stereotyped
rationalizations based on sex to determine whether they rest on some ground which has a
sufficient relationship to a legislative goal. In finding an enactment that prescribed size
and weight requirements for police officers to be discriminatory against women, the court
rejected the notion that administrative convenience could justify restrictions on the employment of women. Id. at 1139.
See also Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1296 (8th Cir. 1973)
(in enjoining enforcement of an athletic conference's regulation that prohibited girls from
participating in interscholastic sports, the court indicated it would strike down laws "when
they provide dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated with
respect to the object of the classification"); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d
629, 633 (2d Cir. 1973) (in determining that an appropriate governmental interest was not
furthered by a rule that required a teacher to take a maternity leave after six months of
pregnancy, the Second Circuit noted the hesitancy of the Court "to speculate as to what
unexpressed legitimate state purposes may be rationally furthered by a challenged statutory
classification").
37 Compare Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) with Healy v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp.
1110 (E.D. La. 1973), prob. juris. noted, 94 S.Ct. 1405 (1974).
The statute upheld in Hoyt exempted women from jury service, the Court finding it
constitutionally permissible to free a woman from her civic duty to attend to her other
responsibilities. 368 U.S. at 62. Such exemptions are a part of the statutory schemes of
several states, see id. at 62 n.6, and had survived constitutional challenge until Healy. In
that case, the court interpreted Reed as requiring that a state provide like treatment for
all who are similarly situated with respect to the purposes of the legislation. 363 F. Supp.
at 1113-14. Differences in sexual characteristics have no bearing on qualifications for jury
service. Id. at 1114.
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to reconcile the result in Reed with the test applied and concluded that
what the Court accomplished in Reed was precisely what it wished to
avoid: a revised equal protection formula. And that result could not
have been reached without "some special sensitivity to sex as a classifying factor enter[ing] into the analysis." 8 9
In Frontiero v. Richardson,40 the Court was again invited to review a classification based on sex. A four-man plurality agreed with the
judicial and academic authorities who had concluded that Reed signalled a departure from the Court's traditional view of sex-based classifications. 41 In Frontiero, a married female Air Force officer sought to
claim her husband as a dependent and thereby obtain an additional
quarters allowance as well as medical and dental benefits. Her application was denied on the ground that she had failed to satisfy the dependency standard set by statute, which specified that a servicewoman had
to prove her husband's dependency. 42 Under the same statutory scheme,
a serviceman could claim his wife as a dependent regardless of whether
she was in fact dependent on him. 48 The statutes were especially burdensome for servicewomen, since they were in all cases required to
establish dependency and in many instances were deprived of benefits
to which identically situated servicemen were entitled. The plurality
38 Gunther, supra note 12, at 34. There was no lack of legitimate interests ttiat could
have been served by the statute. The Court mentioned two-the reduction of the probate
courts' workload that would result from automatic resolution of some contests and the
avoidance of intrafamily controversy. 404 U.S. at 76-77. The Idaho supreme court had
offered yet another rationalization: that men were generally better versed in business
matters and thus more likely to prove able administrators. Reed v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511,
514, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (1970). Any one of those goals could conceivably have satisfied the
traditional test. Additionally, it has been suggested that the state's interest in promoting
administrative efficiency would have been enough to satisfy such priority classifications
under traditional tests. Gunther, supra note 12, at 34. The only satisfactory explanation
for the result is that the Court is especially suspicious of classifications based on sex and
will not accept administrative cost as a justification for such classifications. Id. Although
Reed does not suggest the type of justification that would be sufficient to sustain a sexbased classification, it does suggest the criteria that will be considered and those that will
be insufficient. In any case, it is evidence that the Court will change its manner of looking
at sex-related classifications without changing its equal protection formulas-at least
nominally. See Getman, supra note 33, at 162.
It should be noted that the very-same Court that decided Reed characteristically resorts
to traditional equal protection language when dealing with economic and social welfare
expenditures. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
For a proposed model for viewing classifications which might not qualify as "suspect,"
see Note, A Question of Balance: Statutory Classifications Under the Equal Protection
Clause, 26 STAN. I REv. 155, 163-66 (1973).
89 Gunther, supra note 12, at 34.
40 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See Note, 87 HARv. L. REv. 116 (1973).
41 411 U.S. at 684.
42

Id. at 678. See also 10 U.S.C. § 1072(2)(A) (1970); 37 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1970).

43 10 U.S.C. § 1072(2)(C) (1970); 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
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concluded that sex, like race, was a "suspect" classification since statutory classifications based on sex often serve to relegate women to an
inferior status and generally bear no relation to an individual's ability
to perform in society. 44 Three concurring Justices, however, were already comfortable with the tests set forth in Reed. The three merely
cited Reed and, without explanation, applied it to the facts at hand,
declaring it to be dispositive of the issue. Thus, they found no reason
to reach the question of whether sex should be characterized as "suspect."5
Although recognizing that numerous courts and commentators had
discerned a change of equal protection standards of review in Reed
and Frontiero,the Wiesenfeld court declined to follow suit, 46 citing the
Reed Court's dependence on a 1920 equal protection decision, F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,47 to sustain its contention that the Supreme Court's recent decisions had given birth to no new equal protection formula. The only conclusion that the court permitted itself to
draw was that Reed and Frontierorepresented "an expression of deep
concern" on the part of the Court and a willingness to deal with sex411 U.S. at 686-87.
Id. at 691-92. Justice Stewart filed a concurring opinion one sentence in length,
merely citing Reed. Id. at 691. Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id.
Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, found yet another
reason for deferring confronting the question of whether sex-based classifications are
"suspect." He believed that the Equal Rights Amendment, which had already been submitted to the states for ratification, would be dispositive of that very question. Its resolution was deemed to be a matter for the legislatures. Id. at 692. The plurality looked at
Congress' passage of the Amendment quite differently. Justice Brennan found it significant that an equal branch of government, by its approval of the Equal Rights Amendment, had also concluded that sex-based classifications are "inherently invidious." Id. at
687-88.
46 367 F. Supp. at 988.
47 253 U.S. 412 (1920). Royster Guano involved a statute which taxed both Virginia
corporations and foreign corporations on income derived from in-state and out-of-state
business. Exempted from the operation of the statute were Virginia corporations which
engaged in purely intrastate operations. The Court found no reason for the legislature's
failure to extend an exemption to out-of-state corporations for their operations within the
state. Id. at 415-16.
The language that the Reed Court extracted from Royster Guano sounds more like
the "means-focused" formula than traditional equal protection language:
A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."
404 U.S. at 76 (quoting from F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. at 415).
Dissenting in Royster Guano, Justice Brandeis surmised that Virginia Way have
exempted out-of-state businesses to encourage them to incorporate within the state. 253
U.S. at 418-19. That set of facts is certainly no more unreasonable than those the Court
conceived of to justify its holding in Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). See notes 15-16
supra and accompanying text.
44
45
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based classifications by contemporary standards, "rather than in the
stereotyped generalizations of the Victorian age." 48 The court ascribed
the Supreme Court's reluctance to deem sex a "suspect" classification to
a hesitancy to intrude into the area while the Equal Rights Amendment
is still pending before the state legislatures and to the fact that all of
the Justices in Reed and four in Frontiero felt that the "strict" scrutiny
test need not be applied since both statutes would not survive even
minimum scrutiny. 49 Thus, regardless of what the Wiesenfeld court
thought of the shifting standard of equal protection scrutiny, it did
recognize an attitude of increasing judicial solicitude in cases in which
sex discrimination claims were advanced. However, in the face of all
these developments, the court was uncertain as to how attacks on sexbased classifications fit within the spectrum of equal protection scrutiny
and so set about to apply traditional standards. 50
When applying any equal protection test, a court must first determine the purpose to be served by the legislation. The solution to that
problem in Wiesenfeld was no simple matter since the purpose of section 402(g) was susceptible of conflicting interpretations, and both
parties argued that they would prevail under a minimum scrutiny analysis. The plaintiff pointed to language which indicated that the provisions in section 4 02(g) were meant to amend the Social Security Act in
order "to afford more adequate protection to the family as a unit." 51 He
attributed the omission of widowers from the coverage of the amendment to a combination of legislative oversight and the view of Congress
that women were incapable of supporting a family, a view even more
pronounced in 1939, the year in which section 402(g) was incorporated
into the Social Security Act. 52 The plaintiff characterized the effect of
the exclusion of widowers as a discrimination that was "double-edged."
First, a deceased female breadwinner's social security contributions
48
49

367 F. Supp. at 988.
id. at 989.

5 Id. at 988-89.
51 HoUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, SOCIAL SECURITY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1939,

H.R. REP. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1939). But see id. at 37-38, where the purposes
of the section were described as extending financial benefits to widows, while making no
benefits available to widowers. See generally SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, SOCIAL SECURITY
AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1939, S. REP. No. 734, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1939).
52 Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff Addressed to the Legislative History of 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(g) at 3-4. Even after conceding that throughout its history section 402(g) was only
amended so that it would cover an enlarged class of mothers and that extensions of
benefits to similarly situated fathers had merely been suggested (though never adopted),
the plaintiff found nothing in the history of the enactment to suggest that males should
continue to be excluded from coverage or that differential treatment of men and women
was part of the legislative scheme. Id. at 4-9.
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could never provide to her family benefits available to the family of a
male wage earner. Second, a widowed father could never receive the
same benefits as a widowed mother, even though' either could have
been entrusted with the care of children. This differentiation between
similarly situated individuals, the plaintiff argued, amounts to invid53
ious discrimination.
The plaintiff also relied on Moritz v. Commissioner54 to support
his contention that the statutory distinctions drawn by section 402(g)
constituted a discrimination that was "invidious." In Moritz, the Tenth
Circuit considered a challenge to an Internal Revenue provision that
granted a tax exemption for expenses paid for the care of dependents.
The deduction was available to women and some married men, but excluded from its coverage men who had never married. 55 Applying the
Reed test and finding no satisfactory relation between the means and
the statutory object, the court stated:
If Congress had desired to give relief to persons ... bearing special
burdens of dependents, means were available through classifications geared to such objectives, 56without using the invidious discrimination based solely on sex.

A further reason advanced by the plaintiff to support the unreasonableness of making sex the measure of a recipient's entitlement under the Social Security Act is the "firm national commitment" of Congress to erasing all sex-based distinctions. This commitment led to the
passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 57 which provides
53 Brief for Plaintiff in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 5 [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Plaintiff].
54 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973).
55 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 214, as amended, Revenue Act of 1971, § 210, 85 Stat.
497, provided in part:
(a) General rule.-There shall be allowed as a deduction expenses paid
during the taxable year by a taxpayer who is a woman or widower, or is a husband whose wife is incapacitated or is institutionalized, for the care of one or
more dependents . . . but only if such care is for the purpose of enabling the
taxpayer to be gainfully employed.
56 469 F.2d at 470. The government had argued that tax relief was extended only to
women because they were at such a disadvantage in the job market. But even this
rationalization in terms of economic realities failed to survive the scrutiny by which sexbased classifications must be tested. Id.
57 Brief for Plaintiff at 11-12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970), entitled "Unlawful employment practices," provides in part:
(a) Employer practices.
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
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that no employer, labor union, or other entity subject to the Act shall
discriminate against any individual on the basis of "race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."5 Title VII requires that employers provide
females with an opportunity to establish their fitness for a particular
task.5 9 Both the federal courts6 ° and the decisions of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 6 ' have uniformly proscribed any manner of differential treatment with respect to pension plans. Additionally, it should be noted that Congress never intended that retirement
benefit plans be outside of the coverage of Title VII.62 As the plaintiff
aptly pointed out, it would be anomalous for the government to practice the type of discriminatory treatment it has forbidden to private industry. 63 Finally, the plaintiff quoted statistics to demonstrate the significance of women in the labor force and the extent of the employment
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(emphasis added).
The Equal Pay Act, 29 U.SC. § 206(d) (1970), also prohibits any employer from
discriminating "between employees on the basis of sex."
58 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
59 Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971), represents the
strongest statement of the principle that each female applicant should be judged on her
own capabilities and each must be provided an opportunity to demonstrate individual
capacity. See also Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089, 1096 (S.D. Ohio
1971). For discussions of the effect of Title VII on sexually discriminatory employment
practices, see Note, Employment Practices and Sex Discrimination:Judicial Extension of
Beneficial Female Protective Labor Laws, 59 CORNELL L. Rev. 133 (1973); Note, Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 84 HARV. L. Rev. 1109, 1166-95 (1971).
60 See Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 365 F. Supp. 957, 965-66 (D. Md. 1973) (higher
retirement age for men violative of Title VII unless a business purpose necessitates the
differential treatment); Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454, 462 (D.N.J.
1971), aff'd, 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973) (provisions that allow for different reductions in
the amount of pensions must be based on something other than sex).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex expressly prohibit employers from making available to wives and families of
male workers those benefits not available to the husbands and families of female workers:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to make available benefits for the wives and families of male employees where the same benefits
are not made available for the husbands and families of female employees ....
29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(d) (1973).
61 EEOC Decision No. 72-1919, CCH EmP. Pnscrscns DECISIONS
6370 (1972) (plan
that provided smaller reduction for females who retire early held discriminitory); EEOC
Decision No. YNY9-034, CCH EMP. PRACIcEs DECISIONS
6050 (1969) (death benefit plan
which provided an automatic pension for widows but not widowers held discriminatory).
62 See Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1190 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 US. 939 (1971).
63 Brief for Plaintiff at 13.
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of married women who live with their husbands. 64 The unmistakable
suggestion is that the law should change to reflect current economic
realities.
Some of the same statistics, however, were invoked by the defendant to support its most basic argument for the rationality of section
402(g). According to the defendant, the purpose and effect of the
measure are means of compensating for past discrimination against
women. 65 As a class, widowed mothers are much more likely to be in
economic straits than widowed fathers. Women's earnings are likely to
be much lower than men's, and women are often forced to leave their
employment to raise families. 66 Thus, in the defendant's view, the section rectifies past injustices to which women have been subjected. The
defendant also cited the fact that Congress had consistently rejected
67
proposals that would have extended "widows" benefits to widowers.
An advisory council report submitted pursuant to the Social Security
Act found equal treatment of widows and widowers undesirable for
substantially the same reasons put forward by the defendant.6 8
Despite the fairly widespread judicial disapproval of variations in
amounts of retirement benefits based on sex, some courts have held that
discrimination of that type is permissible where its objective is to elevate a disadvantaged group. In Gruenwald v. Gardner,69 for example,
the Second Circuit found that giving women more favorable treatment
in allocation of social security benefits is a valid means of reducing
"the disparity between the economic and physical capabilities of a man
and a woman." 70 One court has even suggested that closing this eco64 Id. at 13-14. For example, as of April, 1971, almost 43% of women 16 and over
were employed, as compared with 29% in March, 1940. Women earn more than their
husbands in 7.4% of American households. Id.
65 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary
Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 14 [hereinafter
referred to as Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss].
66 Id. For 1971, the median husbands' income was $8858. Id. The median wives' income was $3325. Defendant's Exhibit C, Table 3. In addition, statistics for the same year
indicate that the woman was the sole wage earner in only 2% of all households. Defendant's
Exhibit B, Table 1.
67 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 10-13.
68 SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE 1971 ADvIsoRY
COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY 21-23 (1971). The Council found reasons for treating widows
differently than widowers:
(1) It is reasonable to assume that a woman loses her means of support when her
husband dies; men are generally not so dependent on their wives.
(2) A woman 'left with the responsibility for the care of children should be given
the choice of staying home and caring for them. The same choice should not be offered
a man. Id.
69 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968).
70 390 F.2d at 592.
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nomic gap qualifies as a "compelling" state interest. 71 The court in
Wiesenfeld noted the defendant's argument that the measure it was
considering, like the one in Gruenwald, stands on a footing different
from the one the Supreme Court struck down in Frontiero,where Justice Brennan seemed to distinguish between statutes that find their
justification in administrative efficiency and those that aim at rectifying
72
the effects of a long history of sex discrimination.
In addition, the defendant asserted that even if sex were declared
"suspect," this would not automatically preclude all classifications
based on sex. Ample support can be found for the proposition that
"suspect" classifications are not forbidden per se. Remedial 'measures
based on racial distinctions may be rationally related to the legitimate
end of compensating for the effects of past discrimination. 78 For instance, the Supreme Court has rejected the equal protection claims of
those who have attacked the use of racial classifications in structuring.a
unitary school system. 74 In general, where racial criteria are used for
promoting equality rather than denying it, courts will not find violations of equal protection. 75 Indeed, courts have suggested that not to
71 McEvoy v. Weinberger, Civ. No. 72-1727, at 2 (S.D. Fla. August 28, 1973).
72 367 F. Supp. at 990. The court expressed no opinion as to the continuing validity

of Gruenwald in light of Reed. However, the former is plainly at odds with decisions that
have followed Reed. See Moritz v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 466, 470 (10th Cir. 1972).
Although Justice Brennan offered no express approval of Gruenwald,'his citing it as
an attempt to rectify past discrimination strongly implies his endorsement of that holding.
411 U.S. at 689 n.22.
Subsequent to Wiesenfeld, the Court did give express approval to such positive
discrimination. In Kahn v. Shevin, 94 S. Ct. 1734 (1974), it upheld against an equal
protection challenge a Florida -statute that granted an annual property tax exemption to widows, while offering no analogous benefits to widowers. In a brief opinion,
the Court found the statute was designed to relieve "the financial impact of spousal
loss upon the sex for whom that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden." Id.
at 1737. Since the classification that singled out women for these benefits was grounded
on a difference which was sufficiently related to the purpose of the legislation, the Reed
test was satisfied. The Court distinguished Frontiero inasmuch as the statute challenged
there was in no way meant to "cushion" any economic disparity. It was based solely on
administrative convenience. Id.
Although he had suggested in Frontierothat such a classification might be permissible,
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. He found the statute overinclusive
in that it was available to a "financially independent heiress." The statute could have
been drawn more narrowly to cure that deficiency. Id. at 1740. Justice White filed a
separate dissent, asserting that the state had failed to adequately explain the reason for
excluding men from the statute's coverage. Id.
73 See Note, Developments in the Law--Equal Protection, 82 HAxRv. L. REv. 1065,
1107-13 (1969). The Court has never precluded the possibility of sustaining even an invidious classification. What is necessary is a "legitimate overriding purpose independent
of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this dassification." Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
74 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecldenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
75 See, e.g., United States v. Local 212, IBEW. 472 F.2d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 1973); Con-
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act where discrimination can be alleviated amounts to a breach of an
affirmative duty.7 6 In DeFunis v. Odegaard,77 the Supreme Court of
Washington expressed this obligation in another way in holding that
a law school could consider racial factors in choosing among applicants: "[T]he Constitution is color conscious to prevent the perpetua78
tion of discrimination and to undo the effects of past segregation."
Perhaps convinced by the considerable precedent that had sustained the validity of remedial legislation and certainly by the defendant's contention that section 402(g) represented a reasonable attempt
to provide for households that had lost a male breadwinner, 79 the
Wiesenfeld court found that the statute survived traditional equal protection scrutiny. In the court's view, the Social Security Administration
did not act arbitrarily in singling out women for the receipt of benefits
since women were at an acute disadvantage in the job market.8 0 That
the court engaged in a rather elaborate analysis to find a rational basis
for section 402(g) would seem to represent its implicit rejection of the
technique of "means-focused" scrutiny, which allows a court to make
a narrow inquiry to ensure that the means further the legislative goal
and to avoid judgments as to the wisdom of the statutory purpose. Like
the Warren Court, the court in Wiesenfeld established its belief in
judicial intervention and its willingness to make constitutional judgments on the broader basis for decision.81
Thus, satisfied that the statute passed the minimum scrutiny test,
the Wiesenfeld court looked to this broader constitutional ground of
decision to decide if classifications based on sex should be declared
"suspect." This inquiry was a brief one. The court simply agreed with
the analogy drawn by Justice Brennan in Frontiero that
since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition
of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because
of their sex would seem to violate "the basic concept of our system
that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility ....
" And what . .. aligns it with the recognized
tractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 177 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854
(1971).
76 See Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1968);
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 840 (1967).
77 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot, 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974).
78 82 Wash. 2d at 29, 507 P.2d at 1180.
79 Defendant's First Supplemental Memorandum at 15.
80 367 F. Supp. at 990.
81 Id.
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suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently
bears no
82
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.
Having determined that sex-based classifications are "suspect," the
court had only to mechanically apply the "close judicial scrutiny" standard to the statute. The court reasoned that even though Congress intended section 402(g) to compensate for past discrimination against
women, its effect was to "heap on" extra disabilities in not extending to
the families of women the same benefits granted to the families of male
breadwinners. The court believed that however much a law attempts
to undo past wrongs against any group, it cannot satisfy a "compelling"
governmental interest if it works a discrimination against some mem8 3
bers of the group it seeks to protect.
Comparison of the manner in which the court reached its conclusion with the plurality's reasoning in Frontiero is instructive. What is
immediately apparent is that the statutes in both cases are predicated
on the assumption that the husband is the principal wage earner while
the wife is the caretaker of the home and children. Both opinions rejected this concept and recognized that there are female wage earners
and that it would be constitutionally impermissible to saddle them with
additional economic burdens. As the plaintiff in Wiesenfeld pointed
out, section 402(g) is even more onerous than the provision challenged
in Frontiero,where a servicewoman could at least prove her husband's
dependency. In the instant case, the husband was denied even the op84
portunity to establish dependency.
Even more basic, however, is the difference between "meansfocused" scrutiny of Frontiero and the more traditional approach of
Wiesenfeld. Although the court in Frontierorecognized that the purpose of the challenged statute was to offer members of the uniformed
services benefits to induce their reenlistment, it never pursued an analysis of this objective. Instead, the court looked to the purpose of the
classification, finding its only justification in "administrative convenience."' 5 This analysis of means rather than of statutory purpose is
what distinguishes the new equal protection formula from the traditional two-tiered approach. Using "means-focused" scrutiny, a court
is less willing to question the basis of statutory goals and will only

make inquiry into whether the means actually further those goals. In
82 411 U.S. at 686 (quoting from Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175
(1972)) (citation & footnote omitted).
83 367 F. Supp. at 991.
84 Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at
5-6.
85 Compare 411 U.S. at 679 with id. at 688.
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contrast, the Wiesenfeld court consistently read the purpose of section 402(g) as a provision for widows of deceased wage earners. Unlike.
the plurality in Frontiero, the court never sought to discern the rationale for the statutory classification. Had the court done so, it might
have accepted the plaintiff's interpretation of the statute-that section 4 02(g) was meant to benefit the families of all deceased wage
earners-and recognized that the purpose of the classification was the
administrative convenience that would flow from the assumption that
the families of all deceased male wage earners would be in need of assistance, while the families of all deceased female wage earners would
not. Having found administrative efficiency to be the only justification
for the classification, the court could simply have invoked Reed and
ended its inquiry. For if there is one principle that Reed unequivocally
established, it is that convenience and the elimination of hearings will
not justify the mandatory preference of one sex over the other.8 6 The
Wiesenfeld court's reluctance to engage in this manner of "meansfocused" scrutiny is probably due in part to its preference for the twotiered, interventionist equal protection philosophy and no doubt to uncertainty as to whether a new equal protection test had in fact been
established for-claims of sex discrimination. 7 Perhaps that hesitancy
can also be ascribed to a fear that the claims of cost savings, which were
never proved in Frontiero,could be established to support the presumption of a widower's self-sufficiency implicit in section 4 02(g) and that
88
the statute might be upheld under minimum scrutiny for that reason.
For it should be noted that the defendant had demonstrated that the
changes mandated by invalidation of the classification were, unlike the
ones in Reed and Frontiero,far-reaching and likely to put a considerable strain on the social security system.8 9
86 404 U.S. at 76.
87 367 F. Supp. at 988.
88 Proof of cost savings was never adduced in Fronliero, as the government never

established that it is cheaper to grant benefits to all male members than to determine the
ones whose wives qualify as dependents. There was in fact substantial evidence that
if servicemen had to establish the dependency of their wives, many could not do so. 411
U.S. at 689.
Surprisingly, the plurality in Frontiero also suggested that cost savings would satisfy
the demands of "strict" judicial scrutiny. Id.
89 The defendant also asserted that the difference in costs between the payments that
would have to be made as a result of the Wiesenfeld court's ruling and those that were
directed in Frontiero was considerable. While only one percent of the uniformed services
would be affected by the decision in Frontiero, the extension of section 402(g) benefits to
widowers would involve approximately 15,000 additional applicants and an annual expenditure of an estimated 20 million dollars. The increase in the taxable payroll would
be only 0.01 percent. Defendant's First Supplemental Memorandum at 9-10.
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The court in Wiesenfeld also refused to allow the pendency of the
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) 0 to foreclose its inquiry into whether
sex-based classifications were to be considered "suspect." In Frontiero,
three concurring Justices grounded their refusal to deal with sex as "suspect" on that very circumstance, assuming that the ERA would be dispositive of the issue.91 But the consequences of the ERA and the declaration that classifications on the basis of sex are "suspect" are arguably
quite different. Whereas a legislative enactment may survive "compelling" interest scrutiny if it seeks to relieve the burdens placed on a
"suspect" group by past discrimination, the ERA has been interpreted
to mean that sex is never to be a consideration when the legal rights of
women are being determined. 92 The philosophy that underlies the
ERA is that there should be no justification for the presumption that
all members of one sex are possessed of a particular characteristic just
because the trait is prevalent among members of that sex.93 Under the
ERA, sex is more than a "suspect" classification-it is a prohibited
classification.
The defendant also argued strenuously that extension of section 402(g) benefits to
widowers was not a proper exercise of legislative power. The amount spent and the persons on whom it should be spent are determinations to be made by the legislature.
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 20-22. The court passed over this
contention without comment. 367 F. Supp. at 991.
90 The Equal Rights Amendment provides in part:
Section 1. Equality of Rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971).
91 411 U.S. at 692. Justice Powell stated:
The Equal Rights Amendment . . .if adopted will resolve the substance of this
precise question ....If this Amendment is duly adopted, it will represent the will
of the people accomplished in the manner prescribed by the Constitution ...
It seems to me that this reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a major
political decision which is currently in process of resolution does not reflect appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative processes.
Id.
92 See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 889-90 (1971).
93 Id. at 889. The basic principle of the amendment is that the rights of both males
and females should be merged into a "'single system of equality.'" Id. at 890. It rejects a
dual standard wherein women would be "upgraded" in status through positive discrimination. In addition, the only legislative goals permissible would be those based on characteristics possessed by both sexes. Only an unequivocal ban on the use classifications based on
sex can achieve the purposes of the ERA. Id. at 890-91.
The ERA makes the constitutional judgment that grouping by sex for purposes of
administrative efficiency is impermissible. All women should not be penalized for the
behavioral characteristics of some. (Title VII already makes this judgment with respect
to employment.) Id. at 890-92.
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Whatever the merits of the ERA and whatever the differences between "strict" scrutiny and "means-focused" scrutiny, those differences
have so far been more conceptual than real. The "means-focused" analysis of Reed has been the impetus for lower courts to invalidate a wide
variety of statutes that draw a line between the sexes. 94 However, Reed
provides no guidance as to what considerations would be sufficient to
sustain sex-based classifications. Reed merely established that administrative convenience would not justify such classifications. If the Reed
Court intended to discourage statutory classifications based on sex, it
could have achieved much the same result by employing an analysis
similar to the "strict" scrutiny test invoked in Wiesenfeld and by declaring sex a "suspect" classification. The application of the "strict"
scrutiny formula would dispel the ambiguities of Reed and facilitate a
court's reasoning process. What the use of the "suspect" label amounts
to is a more explicit declaration of judicial displeasure with sex-based
classifications, most of which are founded on stereotyped perceptions of
the characteristics and capabilities of a particular sex, not on considerations of individual merit. Justice Brennan's analogy is well-conceived.
Like race, sex is a highly visible and "immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth." 95
Mark Shlafmitz
94 See cases cited in note 36 supra.
95 411 U.S. at 686.

